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Aiding the Enemy

(Sorry Birchers, I’m stealing this whole article)

Even as its talk radio auxiliaries accuse the New York Times and other media outlets of “treason,” “sedition,” and offering “aid and comfort to the enemy,” the Bush regime has quietly shut down the CIA’s Osama bin Laden Unit.

What would Bush’s core constituency think of this development, were they capable of critical thought? Unless and until a cure is found for self-inflicted lobotomy (also known as “Hannitization,” in honor of the first victim), we will never know.

It’s tempting to think that this development has much less to do with any current event than with the disclosure found near the end of Ron Susskind’s new book The One Percent Doctrine: The CIA concluded that Osama released his election-eve videotaped warning on October 29, 2004 in order to aid Bush’s relection effort.

“Bin Laden certainly did a nice favor today for the president,” stated deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin at an evening CIA meeting to assess terrorist threats. “Around the table there were nods,” reports Suskind, drawing on accounts of people who were present. “Certainly he would want Bush to keep doing what he’s doing for a few more years.”

“But an ocean of hard truths before them – such as what did it say about US policies that bin Laden would want Bush reelected – remained untouched,” comments Suskind.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen – the West Point graduate, former Army paratrooper, and veteran of six overseas tours for the CIA, and an Agency point man on WMDs and terrorism – recalled: “It was sad. We just sat there. We were dispirited. We had nothing left at that point.”

While the patriots in the CIA were demoralized, Bush’s minions, led by the Agency’s new uber-loyalist Director, Porter Goss, “were running loyalty tests,” reports Suskind. “Goss made clear what he would later write in an all-agency memo: that CIA is there to support the policies of the administration. Period.” The Director’s agents, dubbed the “Gosslings” (any resemblance to the term “Quislings” is strictly intentional) would eventually purge the professionals and patriots from the Agency’s ranks.

Not as bloody as the notorious Yezhovschina, during which the “Bloody Dwarf” appointed by Stalin to bring the NKVD to heel killed countless people of dubious political loyalty, the Goss purge was carried out for the same reasons.

The Great Purge insulated Soviet Russia’s Dear Leader while decapitating the nation’s military and leaving it vulnerable to Hitler’s June 1941 double-cross. The parallels aren’t perfect, of course, but it’s worth considering whether the Bush regime’s intelligence purge will have similar consequences for the US.

Whether through perversely determined incompetence or outright collusion, the Bush regime’s Iraq policy dovetails precisely with al-Qaeda’s strategy. Bush’s defenders have often invoked the “flypaper strategy” — namely, the idea that by attracting Islamist radicals to Iraq, the US would be fighting them “over there” rather than “over here.” But al-Qaeda prefers to see the US mired in the Gulf region, and its strategy depends on it.

This is outlined in “The Management of Savagery,” a 268-page manifesto written in 2004 by al-Qaeda insider Abu Bakr Naji and recently published in English translation by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

“Al-Qaeda’s strategic vision involves challenging the United States and its allies overseas using small- to medium-scale attacks,” summarizes ABC News. The manual concludes that the 9-11 attack “forced the US to fall into the `trap’ of overextending their military and that `it began to become clear to the American administration that it was being drained.

One of Suskind’s most unnerving revelations is that al-Qaeda had planned, then aborted, a gas attack on the New York subway system. “The Management of Savagery” suggests that this decision resulted from a desire to keep the US deeply engaged in the Muslim world, rather than focusing its efforts on defending the home front.

“Naji [author of the al-Qaeda study] believes the way you really hurt empires is to make them commit their military far from their base of operations,” points out Will McCants, a West Point fellow. Naji doesn’t support further 9-11-style attacks on the US “because right now he feels al-Qaeda has the upper hand in the public relations battle” in the Muslim world. “The point is to make [the US] come in” as invaders, where the Muslims who fight our troops will “be seen as fighting the crusaders directly so you’ll win over the public…. That’s the way they want to get to the US.”

What al-Qaeda wanted was a president who would keep the US bogged down in the Persian Gulf, rather than one who would undermine Islamist recruiting efforts and negate its strategic advantage by ending the Iraq war and adopting a more intelligent approach to defending our nation and interests. Either Bush or Kerry would have done nicely, of course, but bin Laden decided it was better to throw his support behind the infidel he knew, rather than the one he didn’t know.

Given the diligence with which they’ve worked to advance al-Qaeda’s objectives, it would be very easy to compile a treason indictment of George W. Bush, his handler Dick Cheney (referred to in the CIA as “Edgar,” according to Suskind), and their colleagues.

In their eagerness to implement a strategy benefiting the advertised enemy in the “war on terror,” the Bush clique has broken numerous laws, ruined entire federal agencies, lied to Congress and the public, and otherwise betrayed their oaths of office.

They can take advantage of one technicality: Since they didn’t bother to obtain a congressional declaration of war, it’s doubtful that there are legal grounds for a treason charge.

One Afterthought

Some thoughtful observers believe that al-Qaeda, rather than being the disciplined, world-historic menace regularly depicted in the media, is little more than a loosely organized club that occasionally commits large-scale terrorist acts. Others insist that “al-Qaeda” is merely a brand name, or a convenient catch-all title. Yet others maintain that Bush and bin Laden are business partners.

I’ve not yet made up my mind, and – as with everything else about which I venture opinions – I recognize that I’ve got much to learn, and I’ll share anything of value I come across.

© 2006 Stress.